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2013년 4월 17일 수요일


RULE 9011. SIGNING OF PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT; SANCTIONS; VERIFICATION AND COPIES OF PAPERS

(a) Signature. Every petition, pleading, written motion, and other paper, except a list, schedule, or statement, or amendments thereto, shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign all papers. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,— 1
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 7004. The motion for sanctions may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected, except that this limitation shall not apply if the conduct alleged is the filing of a petition in violation of subdivision (b). If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability To Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 7026 through 7037.
(e) Verification. Except as otherwise specifically provided by these rules, papers filed in a case under the Code need not be verified. Whenever verification is required by these rules, an unsworn declaration as provided in 28 U.S.C. §1746 satisfies the requirement of verification.
(f) Copies of Signed or Verified Papers. When these rules require copies of a signed or verified paper, it shall suffice if the original is signed or verified and the copies are conformed to the original.

Notes

(As amended Mar. 30, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Aug. 1, 1991; Apr. 11, 1997, eff. Dec. 1, 1997.)
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1983
Subdivision (a). Excepted from the papers which an attorney for a debtor must sign are lists, schedules, statements of financial affairs, statements of executory contracts, Chapter 13 Statements and amendments thereto. Rule 1008 requires that these documents be verified by the debtor. Although the petition must also be verified, counsel for the debtor must sign the petition. See Official Form No. 1. An unrepresented party must sign all papers.
The last sentence of this subdivision authorizes a broad range of sanctions.
The word “document” is used in this subdivision to refer to all papers which the attorney or party is required to sign.
Subdivision (b) extends to all papers filed in cases under the Code the policy of minimizing reliance on the formalities of verification which is reflected in the third sentence of Rule 11 F.R.Civ.P. The second sentence of subdivision (b) permits the substitution of an unsworn declaration for the verification. See 28 U.S.C. §1746. Rules requiring verification or an affidavit are as follows: Rule 1008, petitions, schedules, statements of financial affairs, Chapter 13 Statements and amendments; Rule 2006(e), list of multiple proxies and statement of facts and circumstances regarding their acquisition; Rule 4001(c), motion for ex parte relief from stay; Rule 7065, incorporating Rule 65(b) F.R.Civ.P. governing issuance of temporary restraining order; Rule 8011(d), affidavit in support of emergency motion on appeal.
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1987 Amendment
The statement of intention of the debtor under §521(2) of the Code is added to the documents which counsel is not required to sign.
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1991 Amendment
Subdivision (a) is amended to conform to Rule 11 F.R.Civ.P. where appropriate, but also to clarify that it applies to the unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the administration of the case. Deletion of the references to specific statements that are excluded from the scope of this subdivision is stylistic. As used in subdivision (a) of this rule, “statement” is limited to the statement of financial affairs and the statement of intention required to be filed under Rule 1007. Deletion of the reference to the Chapter 13 Statement is consistent with the amendment to Rule 1007(b).
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1997 Amendment
This rule is amended to conform to the 1993 changes to F.R.Civ.P. 11. For an explanation of these amendments, see the advisory committee note to the 1993 amendments to F.R.Civ.P. 11.
The “safe harbor” provision contained in subdivision (c)(1)(A), which prohibits the filing of a motion for sanctions unless the challenged paper is not withdrawn or corrected within a prescribed time after service of the motion, does not apply if the challenged paper is a petition. The filing of a petition has immediate serious consequences, including the imposition of the automatic stay under §362 of the Code, which may not be avoided by the subsequent withdrawal of the petition. In addition, a petition for relief under chapter 7 or chapter 11 may not be withdrawn unless the court orders dismissal of the case for cause after notice and a hearing.
GAP Report on Rule 9011. The proposed amendments to subdivision (a) were revised to clarify that a party not represented by an attorney must sign lists, schedules, and statements, as well as other papers that are filed.

PART 28 - THE FAST TRACK

Part 28 THE FAST TRACK

Scope of this Part

28.1

This Part contains general provisions about management of cases allocated to the fast track and applies only to cases allocated to that track.
(Part 27 sets out the procedure for claims allocated to the small claims track)
(Part 29 sets out the procedure for claims allocated to the multi-track)
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General provisions

28.2

(1) When it allocates a case to the fast track, the court will give directions for the management of the case and set a timetable for the steps to be taken between the giving of the directions and the trial.
(2) When it gives directions, the court will –
(a) fix the trial date; or
(b) fix a period, not exceeding 3 weeks, within which the trial is to take place.
(3) The trial date or trial period will be specified in the notice of allocation.
(4) The standard period between the giving of directions and the trial will be not more than 30 weeks.
(5) The court’s power to award trial costs is limited in accordance with Part 46.
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Directions

28.3

(1) The matters to be dealt with by directions under rule 28.2(1) include –
(a) disclosure of documents;
(b) service of witness statements; and
(c) expert evidence.
(2) If the court decides not to direct standard disclosure, it may –
(a) direct that no disclosure take place; or
(b) specify the documents or the classes of documents which the parties must disclose.
(Rule 31.6 explains what is meant by standard disclosure)
(Rule 26.6(5) deals with limitations in relation to expert evidence and the likely length of trial in fast track cases)
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Variation of case management timetable

28.4

(1) A party must apply to the court if he wishes to vary the date which the court has fixed for –
(a) the return of a pre-trial check list under rule 28.5;
(b) the trial; or
(c) the trial period.
(2) Any date set by the court or these Rules for doing any act may not be varied by the parties if the variation would make it necessary to vary any of the dates mentioned in paragraph (1).
(Rule 2.11 allows the parties to vary a date by written agreement except where the rules provide otherwise or the court orders otherwise)
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Pre-trial check list (listing questionnaire)

28.5

(1) The court will send the parties a pre-trial check list (listing questionnaire) for completion and return by the date specified in the notice of allocation unless it considers that the claim can proceed to trial without the need for a pre-trial check list.
(2) The date specified for filing a pre-trial check list will not be more than 8 weeks before the trial date or the beginning of the trial period.
(3) If no party files the completed pre-trial checklist by the date specified, the court will order that unless a completed pre-trial checklist is filed within 7 days from service of that order, the claim, defence and any counterclaim will be struck out without further order of the court.
(4) If –
(a) a party files a completed pre-trial checklist but another party does not;
(b) a party has failed to give all the information requested by the pre-trial checklist; or
(c) the court considers that a hearing is necessary to enable it to decide what directions to give in order to complete preparation of the case for trial,
the court may give such directions as it thinks appropriate.
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Fixing or confirming the trial date and giving directions

28.6

(1) As soon as practicable after the date specified for filing a completed pre-trial check list the court will –
(a) fix the date for the trial (or, if it has already done so, confirm that date);
(b) give any directions for the trial, including a trial timetable, which it considers appropriate; and
(c) specify any further steps that need to be taken before trial.
(2) The court will give the parties at least 3 weeks’ notice of the date of the trial unless, in exceptional circumstances, the court directs that shorter notice will be given.
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Conduct of trial

28.7

Unless the trial judge otherwise directs, the trial will be conducted in accordance with any order previously made.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION

Civil Action No. 1125-86


WILLIAM THOMAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WASHINGTON TIMES, INC.,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS

Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the Defendant hereby moves to dismiss the action against it in its entirety. Service of process was not effected in accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, although Plaintiff purports to sue the "Washington Times, Inc.," no such entity exists. Finally, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The grounds for this Motion are more fully set forth in the Memorandum submitted in support hereof.
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to quash service of process and dismiss the Complaint in its entirety and enter such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Lucinda J. Bach ALLEN V. FARBER, Bar No. 912865
LUCINDA J. BACH, Bar No. 375366
Schwalb, Donnenfeld, Bray & Silbert
A Professional Corporation Suite 300 East
1025 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 965-7910 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION
Civil Action No. 1125-86
WILLIAM THOMAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WASHINGTON TIMES, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant hereby moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia based upon insufficiency of service of process and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, the named Defendant in this action is "Washington Times, Inc. " No such corporation exists. The Washington Times is published by a New York corporation, News World Communications, Inc. News World has appointed a registered agent to accept service of process in the District of Columbia.
Plaintiff apparently made no effort to discover the proper name of the corporate entity which publishes the Washington Times or to learn the identity of the proper registered agent for service of process. Instead, Plaintiff simply named a nonexistent corporate entity as the Defendant in this action and purported to mail, by regular mail, a copy of the Complaint to Arnaud de Borchgrave and Col. Bo Hi Pak at the Washington Times offices in Washington, D.C. Although Plaintiff identifies Mr. Pak and Mr. de Borchgrave as registered agents of the corporation, that is not the case. Moreover, the only person who received a copy of the Complaint was Arnaud de Borchgrave, who is not authorized to receive service of process. Thus, service of process should be quashed.
In addition to the procedural insufficiencies set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint utterly fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Although Plaintiff purports to state claims for civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, the Complaint fails to allege the necessary elements of either cause of action. Accordingly, as explained in more detail below, Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.

A. INSUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS

Rule 4 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that service upon a corporation may be effected by
mailing a copy of the Summons and Complaint (by first-class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledge conforming substantially to Form 1-A and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender.
Rule 4 further identifies the person to be served to effect service upon a corporation as, "an officer, a managing agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service and process. " Rule 4(d)(3).
Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 4 in that: (1) he failed to mail the Summons and Complaint to an officer, a managing agent, or any other agent authorized to receive service and process; and (2) he failed to include with the Summons and Complaint the notice and acknowledgment required under Rule 4(c)(C)(i). Plaintiff simply mailed a copy of the Complaint and Summons to Arnaud de Borchgrave. Mr. de Borchgrave is not an officer, a managing agent, or otherwise authorize to receive service of process on behalf of News World Communications Inc. Plaintiff also purported to mail a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Bo Hi Pak. However, Mr. Pak never received the Summons and Complaint.
Because Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 4, service of process should be quashed. See Rosen and Associates, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 465 A.2d 1114 (D.C.App. 1983) (a receptionist, even if authorized to sign for and and open all of the mail, is not necessarily authorized to accept service of process); Morfessis v. Marvin's Credit, Inc., 77 A.2d 178, 180 (D.C. 1950) (status as secretary and sole office employee did not establish agency to receive service of process for employer).

B. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Although Plaintiff's Complaint purports to state a claim for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, the Complaint utterly fails to allege the necessary elements of that tort. To state a claim for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, a Complaint must allege: (1) "extreme and outrageous" conduct on the part of the Defendant which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the Plaintiff "severe emotional distress. " Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (1982); Restatement (2nd) of Torts, § 46 (1965). Both the Restatement of Torts and District of Columbia cases make clear that liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, end utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
The Restatement of Torts explains that liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress "clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities." Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 46 (1965).
In Waldon v. Covinqton, 415 A.2d 1070 (1982), the Court analyzed cases allowing recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court concluded that "the outragousness of the defendant's conduct is self-evident in each instance." Id., at 1077. See e.g., Bielitski v. Obadiak, 15 Sask. 153, 65 D.L.R. 627 (1922) (defendant's false story that plaintiff's son had hung himself was spread around and got back to plaintiff as the truth); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931) (defendant's employee delivered a dead rat wrapped up as a loaf of bread to plaintiff).
Plaintiff's allegations fall far short of alleging the sort of outrageous conduct necessary to state a claim for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress. Rather, the Complaint alleges only that Defendant's alleged agent, reporter Steve Masty, participated in a "raid" on Plaintiff and their property in Lafayette Park in the pre-dawn hours of July 4, 1985. Plaintiff further alleged that the Washington Times "cooked up" a story by sending their reporter to report on the "raid." Plaintiff made no effort to describe the actions which they claim constituted a "raid." Nor does Plaintiff take issue with the accuracy of the description of those activities contained in the duly 4, 1985 Washington Times article referenced in the Complaint and attached hereto as Exhibit A. It is clear from reviewing that article that the events complained of do not go "beyond all possible bounds of decency and" cannot be "regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 46.
Moreover, applying a balance test, as did the Court in Waldon v. Covington, this Court should conclude that "the advantage to society of preventing such harm as defendant is here alleged to have inflicted on plaintiffs is minimal when compared with the chilling effect of imposing liability in this kind of situation." 415 A.2d at 1078. Thus, Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed.

C. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY

Plaintiff's Complaint also purports to state a claim for civil conspiracy. Again, the Complaint utterly fails to allege the necessary elements of such a cause of action. Under District of Columbia law, the essential elements of civil conspiracy are, "an agreement to take part in an unlawful action or a lawful action in an unlawful manner, and an overt tortious act in furtherance of the agreement that causes injury." Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C.App. 1983). As the Court explained in that case, "there is no recognized independent tort action for civil conspiracy in the District of Columbia." Rather, liability for civil conspiracy depends on performance of some underlying tortious act.
In this case, Plaintiff utterly failed to allege any underlying tort. The only purported tort claim set forth in the Complaint is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As set forth above, the allegations are insufficient to support such a claim. Thus, the Complaint for civil conspiracy also must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to quash service and process and dismiss the action in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Lucinda J. BachAL EN V. FARBER, Bar No. 912865
LUCINDA J. BACH, Bar No. 375366
Schwalb, Donnenfeld, Bray & Silbert
A Professional Corporation Suite 300 East
1025 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 965-7910

THE WASHINGTON TIMES
CAPITAL SKETCH
Poster war rocks Lafayette Square
By S.J. Masty

It's Independence Day, 4 a.m. and Lafayette Square is almost quiet Among the barricade of posters, signs and billboards that seem a permanents fixture across from the White House, a few people are stirring.
Over in the bushes, a hairy, shirtless fellow seems to be having a conversation with a tree. He gesticulates wildly, waving a Jack Daniels bottle for rhetorical emphasis. A few more snore softly, sacked out under rough lean-tos protesting everything from imminent nuclear war to the law of gravity.
Generally, the authors never use 10 words when 100 will do, but a hand-lettered placard, with the picture of a single red rose, somberly states: "In memory of Norman Mayer, Dec 8, 1982." Nearby, another says "Norman Mayer-Be like him-Dare to struggle, dare to win." Mr. Mayer, in case you forgot, was the public-spirited citizen who parked a truck-bomb beside the Washington Monument until he was given early retirement by a police marksman.
This home for the screwball left is, frankly, a weird place. Momentarily it's going to get a lot weirder.
A White van and a few cars screech to a halt at curbside, disgorging two dozen people, one wearing a blue blazer and tie. They begin dismantling posters, stacking them in the van. If anything seems stranger than yippies and winos, it's the guy with the jacket and tie in Lafayette Park at 4 a. m.
The signs go into the van and are replaced with a large posterboard bearing the uncomplicated slogan, "God Bless America."
This is the work of the Lafayette Liberation League (LLL), says its director, a whimsical young man in red, white and blue T-shirt who goes by the name of Jay Young. His colleagues, however, call him Commander Zero.
"We're basically an ecology group," says Mr. Young, who works days as National Vice Chairman of the Young Americans for Freedom.
"Taking these signs away is our contribution to improving the ecology of Washington. Our sign is made of 100 percent biodegradable materials. It might take 100 years, but it will biodegrade."
"Yeah," says his chum dryly, "we like environment." Everyone ought to have some."
"For too long," Commander Zero continues, "the left clogged up the park with anti-American protest signs, literally across the street from the president's house. But we're not just removing the posters, we're also removing other trash, like beer bottles."
He explains that the LLL has permission from the Park Service to clear away the signs. Anything unattended, from picket signs to Kleenex, say the rangers, counts as trash. Clearly, these umpteen dozen components of the eyesore are unguarded, he explains.
Suddenly, a shot rings out. Well, actually, it's not a shot, but an emaciated and ginger- breaded guy with a pony-tail emerging from a bush, screaming at the top of his lungs.
"Police! Police!" he hollers. From under a lean-to creeps a 4-foot-tall woman with a 2-foot beehive hair-do wrapped in rags. Wearing an ankle-length overcoat in the stifling humidity, she takes up the cry in an Eastern European accent. For emphasis, she throws fistfuls of something at the Liberation League. It looks like Kitty Litter.
A few more combatants wander in from their bedrooms, on the steps of a nearby bank, also screaming for the police.
"It's our property," shouts a guy in front of a sign that reads "Property is Theft."
From the opposite lane on Pennsylvania Avenue, a like model Thunderbird screeches into a 180 degree turn, blocking off the White van, a la Clint Eastwood playing Dirty Harry. A middle-age suburban woman jumps out, shrieking for the police, as the dwarf with the beehive tries to bend the windshield wiper off the van. She isn't tall enough.
Finally a Park Police motorcycle pulls up on the sidewalk as a confused officer tries to figure out what's going on. The looney tunes weren't supposed to start until the Beach Boys concert.
Immediately, he's deluged with bearded, shirtless men demanding that everybody be arrested.
She refuses to give her name because "my mother would kill herself." She also asks that I not mention her T-shirt. "It's a whole-food store. It's not involved," she explains sensibly. There was no whole-food store anywhere in sight. It was probably innocent.
"Death to America yells a small fellow in a dirty shirt. Nobody says anything, but he gets his picture taken. Another tries to explain why Idaho is a fascist state.
A few more policemen turn up and begin taking names. "I'm with the Confederate Memorial Association, says a lanky kid. "No," he adds, "I don't know the phone number, but it's downtown. You can't …"
'This is terrible," says the Virginia housewife, wringing her hands. "It's un-American." She explains that she often stops here to read the signs. "They're an eyesore, though." she adds. miss it "The policeman nods laconically.
The crowd waits for a legal interpretation from Park Police Mission Control. By now, the yippies and yuppies are chatting in small groups. A yuppie asks a yippie the direction of the men's room. The street person points to a shrub. A cute girl in a Catholic University sweatshirt argues against liberation theology with Charlie Manson's long-lost brother.
"Reagan, man," says Mr. Manson, "I mean, like, he creates his own reality. Like, all over the world. Like for everybody."
The beehive lady yells "Noooooo! America means liberty for all. Not for you!" She throws another handful of Kitty Litter on the back of someone's T-shirt.
"Don't go near her," says the socially-concerned housewife. "She's not all right in the head."
"Really?" I ask incredulously. "You mean most people don't sleep in parks, wear ankle-length raincoats in July and throw Kitty Litter?" The housewife doesn't understand.
Finally, Mission Control has a legal opinion. Yes, unattended posters are abandoned property, but no, they don't know what constitutes abandonment. Maybe that means one protester per poster, maybe it means one protester guarding the whole square. The courts haven't decided on that yet.
In the meantime, everybody's posters go back up, including the one saying "God Bless America" The police pack up, leaving everyone disappointed—no goo-goo signs removed, no Neo-Franco Reaganites in the Peoples' Slammer.
The housewife takes a slug from a bottle of Mountain Valley Water. She's heading for the hard stuff; next it will be Woolite.
"Can I have a drink," asks the ginger-beard.
The liberated housewife looks at him in disgust. "I'm not one of the street people," she says. "I don't drink from the same bottle as street people." Even social concern has its limits. She asks him if he has a glass. Glass? We're lucky he has pants.
Slowly, the street folk retire to their concrete sitting rooms and posterboard condominiums. Slowly, the Lafayette Liberation League lines up along the pavement," unfurling a sign: "Young Americans for Freedom for Reagan.
"We're staying here until President Reagan gets up," says a college kid. "We want to sing him a happy Independence Day."
_________________________________________________________________________
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION
WILLIAM THOMAS, et al., )
Plaintiffs, )
v. ) Civil Action No. 1125-86
WASHINGTON TIMES, INC., )
Defendant. )

ORDER
Upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and the Memorandum in support thereof and Plaintiff's opposition thereto, it is, this day ____ of March, 1986,
ORDERED that the Complaint against The Washington Times, Inc. be and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
/s/_____________________________
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
cc:
Mr. William Thomas
Apartment 410
1440 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
Lucinda J. Bach, Esquire
Allen V. Farber, Esquire
Schwalb, Donnenfeld, Bray & Silbert
Suite 300 E
1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 12th day of March, 1986, she served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum in support thereof, and proposed Order, by U. S. Mail with postage prepaid, as follows:
Mr. William Thomas
Apartment 410
1440 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
/s/ Lucinda J. BschLUCINDA J. BACH

Listing of Cases

Proposition One

Peace Park | People 

Strategic lawsuit against public participation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is a lawsuit that is intended to censorintimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition.[1]
The typical SLAPP plaintiff does not normally expect to win the lawsuit. The plaintiff's goals are accomplished if the defendant succumbs to fear, intimidation, mounting legal costs or simple exhaustion and abandons the criticism. A SLAPP may also intimidate others from participating in the debate. A SLAPP is often preceded by a legal threat. The difficulty is that plaintiffs do not present themselves to the Court admitting that their intent is to censor, intimidate or silence their critics. Hence, the difficulty in drafting SLAPP legislation, and in applying it, is to craft an approach which affords an early termination to invalid abusive suits, without denying a legitimate day in court to valid good faith claims.
SLAPPs take various forms but the most common is a civil suit for defamation, which in the English common law tradition is a tort. The common law of libel dates to the early 17th century and (unusual in English law) is reverse onus, meaning, once someone alleges a statement is libelous, the burden is on the defendant to prove that it is not. Various abusive uses of this law including political libel (criticism of the political actions or views of others) have ceased to exist in most places, but persist in some jurisdictions (notably British Columbia and Ontario) where political views can be held as defamatory. A common feature of SLAPP suits is forum shopping, wherein plaintiffs find courts that are more favourable towards the claims to be brought than the court in which the defendant (or sometimes plaintiffs) live.
Other widely mentioned elements of a SLAPP are the actual effectiveness at silencing critics, the timing of the suit, inclusion of extra or spurious defendants (such as relatives or hosts of legitimate defendants), inclusion of plaintiffs with no real claim (such as corporations that are affiliated with legitimate plaintiffs), making claims that are very difficult to disprove or rely on no written record, ambiguous or deliberately mangled wording that lets plaintiffs make spurious allegations without fear of perjury, refusal to consider any settlement (or none other than cash), characterization of all offers to settle as insincere, extensive and unnecessary demands for discovery, attempts to identify anonymous or pseudonymous critics, appeals on minor points of law, demands for broad rulings when appeal is accepted on such minor points of law, and attempts to run up defendants' costs even if this clearly costs more to the plaintiffs.

Contents

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[edit]History

The acronym was coined in the 1980s by University of Denver professors Penelope Canan and George W. Pring[2] The term was originally defined as "a lawsuit involving communications made to influence a governmental action or outcome, which resulted in a civil complaint or counterclaim filed against nongovernment individuals or organizations on a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance." The concept's originators later dropped the notion that government contact had to be about a public issue to be protected by the Right to Petition the Government, as provided in the First Amendment. It has since been defined less broadly by some states, and more broadly in one state (California) where it includes suits about speech on any public issue. [3]
The original conceptualization proffered by Canan and Pring emphasized the right to petition as protected in the United States under the US Constitution's specific protection in the First Amendment's fifth clause. It is still definitional: SLAPPs refer to civil lawsuits filed against those who have communicated to government officialdom (in its entire constitutional apparatus). The Right to Petition, granted by Edgar the Peaceful, King of England in the 10th century, antedates the Magna Carta in terms of its significance in the development of democratic institutions. As currently conceived, the right claims that democracy cannot properly function in the presence of barriers between the governed and the governing.[4]
New York Supreme Court Judge J. Nicholas Colabella, in reference to SLAPPs: "Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined." A number of jurisdictions have made such suits illegal, provided that the appropriate standards ofjournalistic responsibility have been met by the critic.[citation needed]

[edit]Jurisdictional variations

[edit]Canada

Some political libel and forum shopping incidents, both common in Canada, have been called SLAPP suits, because such suits load defendants with costs of responding in unfamiliar jurisdictions or at times (typically elections) when they're extremely busy and short of funds. Both types of suits are almost unique to Canada, so there is little academic concern nor examination of whether political subject matter or remote forums are a clear indicator of SLAPP.

[edit]British Columbia

One of the first cases in Canada to be explicitly ruled a SLAPP was Fraser v. Saanich (see [1999] B.C.J. No. 3100 (B.C. S.C.)) (QL), where the British Columbia Supreme Court struck out the claim of a hospital director against the District of Saanich, holding that it was a meritless action designed to silence or intimidate the residents who were opposed to the plaintiff’s plan to redevelop the hospital facilities.
Following the decision in Fraser v. Saanich, the Protection of Public Participation Act went into effect in British Columbia in April, 2001. The legislation was repealed in August, 2001. There was extensive debate on its merits and the necessity of having hard criteria for judges and whether this tended to reduce or increase process abuse. The debate was largely formed by the first case to discuss and apply the Protection of Public Participation Act (PPPA), Home Equity Development v. Crow.[5] The defendants' application to dismiss the action against them was dismissed. The defendants failed to meet the burden of proof required by the PPPA, that the plaintiffs had no reasonable prospect of success. While it was not the subject of the case, some felt that the plaintiffs did not bring their action for an improper purpose, and the suit did not inhibit the defendants in their public criticism of the particular project, and that the Act was therefore ineffective in this case.
Since the repeal, BC activists especially the BCCLA have argued repeatedly for a broad understanding of SLAPP and a broad interpretation of judicial powers especially in intervener applications in BC and other common law jurisdictions and when arguing for new legislation to prevent SLAPPs. The activist literature contains extensive research on particular cases and criteria. The West Coast Environmental Law Association agrees and generally considers BC to lag other jurisdictions [2]. So do some BC lawyers, again listing specific cases [3].

[edit]Ontario

In Ontario, the decision in Daishowa v. Friends of the Lubicon (see [1996] O.J. No. 3855 Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) (QL) was also instructive on SLAPPs. A motion brought by the corporate plaintiff Daishowa to impose conditions on the defendant Friends of the Lubicon Indian Band that they would not represent Daishowa’s action as a SLAPP was dismissed.
By 2010, the Ontario Attorney-General considered SLAPP a major problem and issued a major report on them [4]. However, a year later nothing substantial had changed, according to commentators [5].

[edit]Quebec

Québec's then Justice Minister, Jacques Dupuis, proposed an anti-SLAPP bill on June 13, 2008. [6] The bill was adopted by the National Assembly of Quebec on June 3, 2009. As of November 2011, Quebec's amended Code of Civil Procedure is the only anti-SLAPP mechanism in force in Canada.
This bill was invoked in Ontario (and then Supreme Court of Canada docket 33819) in the case of Les Éditions Écosociété Inc., Alain DeneaultDelphine Abadie and William Sacher vs. Banro Inc., in which the publisher Écosociété pled (supported by the BCCLA [6]) that it should not face Ontario liability for a publication in Quebec, as the suit was a SLAPP and the Quebec law explicitly provided to dismiss these. As of November 15, 2011, the judgement was still pending, having been heard in the Court in March of 2011.
The Quebec law is substantially different in structure than that of California [7] or other jurisdictions, however as Quebec's Constitution generally subordinates itself to international law, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies. That treaty only permits liability for arbitrary and unlawful speech. The ICCPR has also been cited, in the BC case Crookes v. Newton, as the standard for balancing free speech versus reputation rights. The Supreme Court of Canada in October 2011, ruling in that case, neither reiterated nor rescinded that standard.

[edit]United States

Twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have enacted statutory protections against SLAPPs. [7][verification needed] These states are ArizonaArkansasCaliforniaDelawareFloridaGeorgiaHawaiiIllinoisIndianaLouisianaMaineMarylandMassachusettsMinnesota,[8]MissouriNebraskaNevadaNew MexicoNew YorkOklahomaOregonPennsylvaniaRhode IslandTennesseeTexasUtahVermont, and Washington. In Colorado and West Virginia, the courts have adopted protections against SLAPPs. These laws vary dramatically in scope and level of protection, and the remaining states lack protections.
There is no federal anti-SLAPP law. The extent to which state laws apply in federal courts is unclear, and the Circuit courts have reached different conclusions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has allowed California litigants to use their state's special motion in federal district courts located in California, in cases where the court is hearing at least one California state law claim through the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction[9] However, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law, as a mere matter of procedure, does not apply in federal courts. [10]
It has been argued that the lack of uniform protection against SLAPPs has encouraged forum shopping; proponents of federal legislation have argued that the uncertainty about one's level of protection has likely magnified the chilling effect of SLAPPs.[11]
In December 2009, Rep. Steve Cohen (D–Tennessee) introduced the Citizen Participation Act in the U.S. House. [12] This marks the first time the Congress has considered federal anti-SLAPP legislation, though the Congress enacted a law on the closely related issue of libel tourism.[13] Like many state anti-SLAPP laws, H.R. 4364 would allow the defendant of a SLAPP to have the suit quickly dismissed and to recover fees and costs.

[edit]California

California has a unique variant of anti-SLAPP legislation which has led a significant volume of SLAPP litigation in that state. A search for reported cases on SLAPP litigation in 2009 found 1,386 cases for the State of California alone. The rest of the states combined had about 341, of which Massachusetts accounted for 176, raising the question whether California's SLAPP statute is accomplishing its primary objective of reducing costly litigation [14] The U.S. state of California enacted Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 in 1992, a statute intended to frustrate SLAPPs by providing a quick and inexpensive defense.[3] It provides for a special motion that a defendant can file at the outset of a lawsuit to strike a complaint when it arises from conduct that falls within the rights of petition or free speech. The statute expressly applies to any writing or speech made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, but there is no requirement that the writing or speech be promulgated directly to the official body. It also applies to speech in a public forum about an issue of public interest and to any other petition or speech conduct about an issue of public interest.
To win an anti-SLAPP motion, the defendant must first show that the lawsuit is based on claims related to constitutionally protected activities, typically First Amendment rights such as free speech, and typically seeks to show that the claim lacks any basis of genuine substance, legal underpinnings, evidence, or prospect of success. If this is demonstrated then the burden shifts to the plaintiff, to affirmatively present evidence demonstrating a reasonable probability of succeeding in their case by showing an actual wrong would exist as recognized by law, if the facts claimed were bourne out.
The filing of an anti-SLAPP motion stays all discovery. This feature acts to greatly reduce the cost of litigation to the anti-SLAPP defendant, and can make beating the motion extremely difficult for the plaintiff, because they effectively must prove their case has at least a basis of visible legal merit and is not merely vexatious, prior to discovery.
If the special motion is denied, the order denying the motion is immediately appealable. Defendants prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion (including any subsequent appeal) are entitled to a mandatory award of reasonable attorney’s fees. After an anti-SLAPP motion has been filed, a plaintiff cannot escape this mandatory fee award by amending its complaint. More than 300 published court opinions have interpreted and applied California's anti-SLAPP law. [15]
California's Code of Civil Procedure § 425.17 corrects what the Legislature found to be abuse of the anti-SLAPP statute. [16] Signed into law on September 6, 2003, this statute prohibits anti-SLAPP motions in response to certain public interest lawsuits and class actions, and actions that arise from commercial statements or conduct. Section 425.18, signed into law on October 6, 2005, was enacted to facilitate SLAPP victims in recovering their damages through a SLAPPback (malicious prosecution action) against the SLAPP filers and their attorneys after the underlying SLAPP has been dismissed. [17]

[edit]Balancing the right of access to the courts

The SLAPP penalty stands as a barrier to access to the courts by providing an early penalty to claimants who seek judicial redress. In recent years, the courts in some states have recognized that enforcement of SLAPP legislation must recognize and balance the constitutional rights of both litigants. It has been said:
Since the Magna Carta, the world has recognized the importance of justice in a free society. “To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.” (Magna Carta, 1215.) This nation’s founding fathers knew people would never consent to be governed and surrender their right to decide disputes by force, unless government offered a just forum for resolving those disputes. [18]
The right to bring grievances to the courts, in good faith, is protected by state and federal constitutions in a variety of ways. In most states, the right to trial by jury in civil cases is recognized. The right to cross-examine witnesses is fundamental to our judicial system. Moreover, the first amendment protects the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The “right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.” [19] Because “the right to petition is ‘among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights,’ ... the right of access to the courts shares this ‘preferred place’ in our hierarchy of constitutional freedoms and values. [20] This balancing question is resolved differently in different states, often with substantial difficulty. [21]
In Palazzo v. Alves, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated:
By the nature of their subject matter, anti-SLAPP statutes require meticulous drafting. On the one hand, it is desirable to seek to shield citizens from improper intimidation when exercising their constitutional right to be heard with respect to issues of public concern. On the other hand, it is important that such statutes be limited in scope lest the constitutional right of access to the courts (whether by private figures, public figures, or public officials) be improperly thwarted. There is a genuine double-edged challenge to those who legislate in this area.Empty citation‎ (help)[22]
The most challenging balancing problem arises in application to SLAPP claims which do not sound (give rise to a claim) in tort. The common law and constitutional law have developed in the United States to create a high substantive burden to tort and tort-like claims which seek redress forpublic speech, especially public speech which addresses matters of public concern. The common law in many states requires the pleader to state accurately the content of libelous words. Constitutional law has provided substantive protection which bars recovery against a first amendment defense except upon clear and convincing evidence that there has been deliberate or reckless falsehood. For this reason, ferreting out the bad faith SLAPP claim at an early stage of litigation should be accomplished with relative ease. Extension of the SLAPP penalties to factually complex cases, where the substantive standard of proof at common law is lower presents special challenges.
A Minnesota Supreme Court case, Middle-Snake-Tamarac Rivers Watershed Dist. v. Stengrim, 784 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 2010) establishes a two-step process to determine whether SLAPP procedure should be applied. The decision arises in the context of an effort to enforce a settlement agreement between a local government and an opponent of a flood control project. The landowner had accepted a significant monetary settlement in settlement of his opposition to land acquisition. The landowner agreed as part of the settlement to address no further challenges to the project. When the local government sued the landowner for breach of settlement, the landowner contended that enforcement of the settlement was a strategic lawsuit against public participation. The Supreme Court rejected that claim and affirmed the District Court's denial of SLAPP relief, holding “The District Court properly denied a motion to dismiss where the underlying claim involved an alleged breach of a settlement agreement that potentially limited the moving party’s rights to public participation.” The Supreme Court explained:
Preexisting legal relationships, such as those based on a settlement agreement where a party waives certain rights, may legitimately limit a party’s public participation. It would be illogical to read sections 554.01-.05 as providing presumptive immunity to actions that a moving party may have contractually agreed to forgo or limit.
Under the Minnesota approach, as a preliminary matter, the moving party must meet the burden of showing that the circumstances which bring the case within the purview of SLAPP protection exists. Until that has been accomplished, no clear and convincing burden has been shifted to the responding party.

[edit]Notable SLAPPs

[edit]Europe

  • In 2010 and 2011, a French blogger was summoned twice by the communication company Cometik over exposing their quick-selling method (a.k.a. one shot method) and suggesting a financial compensation for his first trial.[23] The company got dismissed in each affair, but lodged an appeal in each case. On March 31, 2011, the company won:
    • the censorship of any reference (of its name) on Mathias Poujol-Rost′s weblog,
    • €2,000 as damages,
    • the obligation to publish the judicial decision for 3 months,
    • €2,000 as procedural allowance,
    • all justice charges for both first and appeal instances.[24]

[edit]United States

  • Prominent foreclosure defense attorney Matthew Weidner was sued by Nationwide Title, a foreclosure processing firm.[25]
  • Barbra Streisand, as plaintiff, lost a SLAPP motion after she sued an aerial photographer involved in the California Coastal Records ProjectStreisand v. Adelman, (California Superior Court Case SC077257)[26] See Streisand effect.
  • Nationally syndicated talk radio host Tom Martino prevailed in an anti-SLAPP motion after he was sued for libel by a watercraft retailer. The case received national attention for its suggestion that no one reasonably expects objective facts from a typical talk show host, who is often a comedian telling jokes.[27]
  • Kim Shewalter and other neighborhood activists, as defendants, won an anti-SLAPP motion against apartment building owners. The owners had filed a SLAPP suit because of the defendants' protest activities.[28]
  • Barry King and another Internet poster, as defendants, won an anti-SLAPP motion against corporate plaintiffs based on critical posts on an Internet financial message board.[29]
  • Kathi Mills won an anti-SLAPP motion against the Atlanta Humane Society, Atlanta Humane Society v. Mills, in Gwinnett County (Georgia) Superior Court; case 01-A-13269-1[30] She had been sued based on comments she made to an internet forum after a news program had aired critical of the AHS. In part, the judge ruled that private citizens do not need to investigate news coverage before they make their own comments on it. Also that governmental entities may not sue for defamation.[31]
  • Karen Winner, the author of Divorced From Justice, is recognized as "[the] catalyst for the changes that we adopted," said Leo Milonas, a retired justice with the Appellate Division of the New York state courts who chaired a special commission that recommended the changes adopted by Chief Judge Judith Kaye."[32] But in 1999, Winner, along with a psychologist/whistleblower, and several citizens were SLAPPed for criticizing the guardian ad litem system and a former judge in South Carolina. Winner's report, "Findings on Judicial Practices & Court-appointed Personnel In The Family Courts In Dorchester, Charleston & Berkeley Counties, South Carolina" and citizen demonstrations led to the very first laws in South Carolina to establish minimum standards and licensing requirements for guardians ad litem — who represent the interests of children in court cases.[33] The retaliatory SLAPPs have been dragging on for nearly 10 years, with judgments totaling more than $11 million against the co-defendants collectively. Reflecting the retaliatory nature of these suits, at least one of the co-defendants is still waiting to find out from the judges which particular statements if any he made were actually false.[34]
  • From 1981 to 1986, Pacific Legal Foundation and San Luis Obispo County, California, filed a suit attempting to obtain the mailing list of the Abalone Alliance to get the group to pay for the police costs of the largest anti-nuclear civil-disobedience act in U.S. history at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. Pacific Legal Foundation lost at every court level and withdrew the suit the day before it was due to be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.[citation needed]
  • In March 2009, MagicJack (a company who promotes a USB VOIP device) filed a defamation suit against Boing Boing for exposing their unfair and deceptive business tactics regarding their EULA, visitor counter, and 30 day trial period. This was dismissed as a SLAPP by a California judge in late 2009. In the resulting ruling, MagicJack was made responsible for most of Boing Boing's legal cost.[35]
  • In the case Comins vs. VanVoorhis a Florida man named Christopher Comins filed a defamation suit against a University of Florida grad student after the student blogged about a video of Comins repeatedly shooting someone's pet dogs. This was cited as an example of a SLAPP suit by the radio show On the Media.[1]
  • In November 2010, filmmaker Fredrik Gertten, as defendant, won an ant-SLAPP motion after he was sued for defamation by Dole Fruit Company. The case concerned Gertten's documentary film about farm workers. The lengthy lawsuit was documented in Gertten's film Big Boys Gone Bananas!*.[36]
  • In January 2011 Sony Computer Entertainment America sued George Hotz and other individuals for jailbreaking the PlayStation 3 and publishing encryption and signing keys for various layers of the system's architecture. The defendants and the Electronic Frontier Foundation consider the case an egregious abuse of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Hotz settled with Sony before trial.[citation needed]
In effort to prevent four women from filing any Public Records Requests without first getting permission from a judge, or from filing future lawsuits, the Congress Elementary School District filed a SLAPP suit on January 28, 2010. The Goldwater Institute, a think tank based in Phoenix, AZ, represented the four defendants. The school district said that it has been harassed so often by Warren that it was not able to functionally educate its students. Toni Wayas, the school district’s superintendent, claimed "that it had, time and time again, complied with the requests" The Goldwater Institute argued that the school district had been in violation of state laws mandating government transparency in the past. Investigations in 2002 and 2007 by the state Ombudsman and Attorney General uncovered violations of the state’s open meeting law by the Attorney General’s Office. According to Carrie Ann Sitren of the Goldwater Institute, this was “a clear attempt to silence people in the community who have been critical of the board’s actions, and have made good-faith attempts to ensure the district is spending taxpayer money wisely.” None of the records requested were private or confidential, and thus, should have been readily available to be released to the public, according to the assistant state Ombudsman.[37]
"Scientology versus the Internet" refers to a number of disputes relating to the Church of Scientology's efforts to suppress material critical of Scientology on the Internet through the use of lawsuits and legal threats.
  • The Agora Six - The Cynwyd Group, LLC v. Stefany (2009)[citation needed]
  • Saltsman v. Goddard
In an effort to stop blogger Alexandria Goddard's website from allowing allegedly defamatory posts about their son, two parents of a teenaged boy from Steubenville, Ohio sued Goddard and a dozen anonymous posters in October 2012.[38] The lawsuit asked for an injunction against the blogger, a public agology that he was not involved in the rape, and $25,000 in damages.[39] The case was dismissed with prejudice in December 2012, after the blogger agreed to post a statement that the boy was remorseful about his role in the aftermath of the Steubenville High School rape case, which was done.[40]

[edit]Canada

  • Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, from 1995 to 1998 a series of judgements [OJ 1536 1995] [OJ 1429 1998 (ONGD)] established that defendants, who had accused a global company of engaging in "genocide", were entitled to recover court costs[41] due to the public interest in the criticism, even if it was rhetorically unjustifiable. This was the first case to establish clearly the SLAPP criteria.
  • Fraser v. Saanich (District) 1995, [BCJ 3100 BCSC] was held explicitly to be a SLAPP, the first known case to be so described. Justice Singh found plaintiff's conduct to be "reprehensible and deserving of censure", ordering he pay "special costs" [page 48, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: The British Columbia Experience, RECEIL 19(1) 2010 ISSN 0962 8797] to compensate.
  • In 2011, in Robin Scory v. Glen Valley Watersheds Society, a BC court ruled that "an order for special costs acts as a deterrent to litigants whose purpose is to interfere with the democratic process,” and that “Public participation and dissent is an important part of our democratic system.”[42][43] However, such awards remained rare.[44]
  • Crookes v. Openpolitics.ca, filed May 2006 [S063287, Supreme Court of BC], and a series of related suits leading to a unanimous October 2011 ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in Crookes v. Newton upholding the rights of online debaters to link freely to third parties without fear of liability for contents at the other end of the link.[45] A number of related rulings had previously established that transient comments on the Internet could not be, in themselves, simply printed and used to prove that "publication" had occurred for purposes of libel and defamation law in Canada. Other elements of the ruling clarified how responsible journalism (and therefore the right to protect anonymous sources), qualified privilege and innocent dissemination defenses applied to persons accused of online defamation.
  • In May 2010, Youthdale Treatment Centres of Toronto, Ontario filed a defamation suit against various former patients, parents of former patients, and other persons, claiming C$5,000.000.00 in damages.[citation needed] The lawsuit, filed on May 5, 2010 on behalf of Youthdale by Harvin Pitch and Jennifer Lake of Teplitsky, Colson LLP claimed that these persons were involved in a conspiracy to, among other things, have Youthdale's licence to operate revoked. Youthdale also claimed their reputation was damaged as a result of various actions by the named defendants, which Youthdale alleged included the creation of websites and blogs containing complaints against Youthdale, including alleged accusations of unlawful administration of psychotropic medications. A notable left-turn for Youthdale occurred in July 2010, when Youthdale became the subject of a Toronto Star investigation, in which it was found that Youthdale had been admitting children to its Secure Treatment Unit that did not have mental disorders.[46] The case is still ongoing against some of the named defendants.
  • Businesspeople Garth Drabinsky and Conrad Black filed numerous suits against critics of their business activities. These received much publicity but were usually settled quickly.
  • Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper filed a suit against the Liberal Party of Canada, the Official Opposition, after the latter paid for trucks to drive through the streets playing a journalist's tape of Harper admitting he knew of "financial considerations" offered to dying MP Chuck Cadman before a critical Canadian House of Commons vote in 2005. This, the Liberals and most commentators and authorities agreed, would be a serious crime if proven. Harper alleged the tape had been altered but a court found no evidence of this. The suit was dropped by Michael Ignatieff after he replaced Stephane Dion as Leader of the Opposition, and so was not heard in court, but was transparently a (successful) effort to get the trucks off the streets.

[edit]Brazil

  • ThyssenKrupp Atlantic Steel Company (TKCSA), one of the largest private enterprises in Latin America, sued Brazilian researchers from public universities as UERJ (Rio de Janeiro State University) and Fiocruz (Oswaldo Cruz Foundation) for moral damages.[47][48] First, TKCSA sued the research pulmonologist, Hermano Albuquerque de Castro from Sergio Arouca National School of Public Health (ENSP – Fiocruz). Then TKCSA sued Alexandre Pessoa Dias, research professor of the Joaquim Venâncio Polytechnic School of Health (EPSJV – Fiocruz) and the biologist Monica Cristina Lima, from Pedro Ernesto University Hospital and board member of the Public University Workers Union of Rio de Janeiro State (Sintuperj). The last two lawsuits occurred after the disclosure of the technical report “Evaluation of social, environmental and health impacts caused by the setup and operation of TKCSA in Santa Cruz”.

[edit]Japan

In 2006, Oricon Inc., Japan's music chart provider, sued freelance journalist Hiro Ugaya due to him suggesting in an article for Cyzo Magazine that the company was fiddling its statistics to benefit certain management companies and labels, specifically Johnny and Associates.[49] He was found guilty in 2008 by the Tokyo District Court and ordered to pay USD 10,000, but he appealed and won. Oricon did not appeal later. His 33-month struggle against Oricon and his research on SLAPPs through his self-expense trip in the United States was featured on the TBS program "JNN Reportage", titled as "Legal Intimidation Against Free Speech: What is SLAPP?".[50]

[edit]See also

[edit]Case studies

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