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Hearsay in United States law

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Hearsay is the legal term for testimony in a court proceeding where the witness does not have direct knowledge of the fact asserted, but knows it only from being told by someone. In general the witness will make a statement such as, "Sally told me Tom was in town," as opposed to "I saw Tom in town," which is direct evidence. Hearsay is not allowed as evidence in the United States, unless one of about thirty eight[1] exceptions applies to the particular statement being made.
The hearsay rule is an analytic rule of evidence that defines hearsay and provides for both exceptions and exemptions from that rule. There is no all-encompassing definition of hearsay in the United States. However, most evidentiary codes defining hearsay adopt verbatim the rule as laid out in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which generally defines hearsay as a "statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."[2]
Historically, the rule against hearsay is aimed at prohibiting the use of another person's statement, as equivalent to testimony by the witness to the fact. Unless the second person is brought to testify in court where they may be placed under oath and cross-examined.

Contents

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[edit]Theory

The theory of the rule excluding hearsay is that assertions made by human beings are often unreliable; such statements are often insincere, subject to flaws in memory and perception, or infected with errors in narration at the time they are given. Furthermore, someone testifying in court regarding another's out-of-court statement may have misheard or misremembered that statement, in addition to possibly having misinterpreted the speaker's sincerity, etc. The law therefore finds it necessary to subject this form of evidence to “scrutiny or analysis calculated to discover and expose in detail its possible weaknesses, and thus to enable the tribunal (judge or jury) to estimate it at no more than its actual value”.[3]
Three tests are calculated to expose possible weaknesses in a statement:
  1. Assertions must be taken under oath
  2. Assertions must be made in front of the tribunal (judge or jury)
  3. Assertions must be subject to cross-examination.
Assertions not subject to these three tests are (with some exceptions) prohibited insofar as they are offered testimonially (for the truth of what they assert).

[edit]Federal Rules of Evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence (See Article VIII) provide a general definition of hearsay as a "statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Subject to two classes of "exemptions," this definition classifies a statement as hearsay if the statement meets two requirements: (1) the statement must be extrajudicial (i.e. not made by this witness in this proceeding). (2) The statement must be offered to prove the truth of what the statement asserts if anything.
However, as noted below, the Federal Rules of Evidence also provide two specific categories of exemptions of certain kinds of statements from this rule; statements in these categories are defined as "Non-hearsay."
Typically, one can classify a statement as hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence using a three-step analysis. A statement will be considered hearsay if it is:
  1. An assertive statement
  2. Made by an out-of-court declarant
  3. Is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein.
An "assertive statement" is generally defined as the intentional communication of fact. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an assertive statement can be oral, written, or non-verbal conduct if it was intended to be an assertion. However, any verbal or non-verbal conduct that was not intended to communicate a fact will not be considered an assertive statement.
In order for the statement to satisfy the "out-of-court declarant" element of hearsay, very simply stated, the statement must have been made outside of the courtroom that the present proceeding is taking place in — meaning that if the statement was made in another courtroom, it is still made by an "out-of-court" declarant. (However, some "out-of-court" statements under oath may still be admissible as a declaration against interest.)
Lastly, if a statement is being offered for its truth — meaning that its relevance depends upon the jury believing the substance of the statement — then it is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. If a statement is relevant for any other purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted therein, then the statement will not be considered hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

[edit]Application

Generally in common law courts the "hearsay rule" applies, which says that a trier of fact (judge or jury) cannot be informed of a hearsay statement unless it meets certain strict requirements. However, the rules for admissibility are more relaxed in court systems based on the civil lawsystem. In the civil law system, the courts, whether consisting only of judges or featuring a jury, have wide latitude to appreciate the evidence brought before them.
[Note: Louisiana, a civil-law jurisdiction, does not share the above referenced feature generally found in civil-law jurisdictions. With few exceptions, Louisiana follows rules predicated upon the Federal Rules of Evidence.]
Furthermore, even in common-law systems, the hearsay rule only applies to actual trials. Hearsay is admissible as evidence in many other judicial proceedings, such as grand jury deliberations, probation hearings, parole revocation hearings, and proceedings before administrative bodies.
In criminal law, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), reformulated the standard for determining when the admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases is permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the ConstitutionCrawford gives enhanced protection to defendants when the hearsay offered against them is testimonial in nature. When a statement is deliberately accusatory, or when the declarant knows that the statement is likely to be used in the prosecution of the defendant for a crime, the need for face-to-face confrontation is at its highest. When statements are directly accusatory, the defense needs an opportunity to explore the accuser’s motives. Where statements are the product of police interrogation, there is a need to ensure that the testimony is not the product of improper coercion or intimidation.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), set forth a two-pronged test in order for hearsay to be admissible against a criminal defendant: (1) the declarant generally must be shown to be unavailable; and (2) the statement must have been made under circumstances providing sufficient “indicia of reliability.” With respect to the second prong, a reliability determination may assume that hearsay is sufficiently reliable for constitutional purposes if it satisfies a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception. In practice this means that lower courts need to make reliability determinations only for hearsay that is offered under a “catchall” exception, such as Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 807, or under new or non-traditional hearsay exceptions that are not “firmly rooted.” However, Crawford v. Washington overruled Ohio v. Roberts.

[edit]Common misconceptions

One major misconception about the hearsay rule is that hearsay is never admissible in court. While the general rule is that such evidence is inadmissible, there are many exceptions.
There are two other common misconceptions concerning the hearsay rule. The first is that hearsay applies only to oral statements. The hearsay rule applies to all out-of-court statements whether oral, written or otherwise.[4] The Federal Rules of Evidence defines a statement as an oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct of a person, if the conduct is intended by the person as an assertion. Even written documents made under oath, such as affidavits or notarized statements, are subject to the 'hearsay rule'.
The second common misconception is that all out-of-court statements are hearsay. This is not the case. An out of court statement may or may not be hearsay depending on the purpose for which it is offered. If the statement is being offered to prove the truth of what it asserts, then it becomes hearsay. When offered for any other purpose the statement is not hearsay. For example: Witness testifies that yesterday he spoke to Jim (who was in Vermont) on the phone and that Jim made the following statement, "It's raining in Vermont!" If the attorney is seeking to use this statement to prove that it was in fact raining in Vermont, then it is hearsay. But, if the attorney is seeking to use the statement to prove that the phone lines were working that day, or that Jim had not lost the power of speech, or for any other purpose, then the statement is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and therefore it is not hearsay.
Consider an additional example:
A police officer, hears cries of "Help, John is trying to kill me!" from inside a house. Believing that there is a crime in progress, the officer kicks the front door down and enters the home to discover the homeowner, John, assaulting a victim, Monica, who is crying and visibly shaking. John is charged with attempted murder. Two separate trials might result from these circumstances.
  1. First, a criminal trial against John, who proclaims his innocence and demands a trial for the criminal charges alleged.
  2. Second, a civil trial in which John sues the police officer for invading his home, wherein the officer will assert that there was just cause to enter the home because he had a genuine belief that a crime was occurring.
In the first trial, the issue is whether John attempted to kill Monica. The Officer is asked to testify to what he heard Monica scream from inside the house: "Help, John is trying to kill me!" This statement would be hearsay. The officer is being asked to testify to what Monica said to prove that John attempted to murder Monica. Unless the attorney can show that this statement falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, the factfinder (the judge or jury) may not consider Monica's statement (this particular statement, however, would likely be admissible because of "Excited Utterance" and "Present sense impression" exceptions).
In the second trial, however, the issue is not whether John tried to kill Monica but rather whether the officer entry into the home was lawful. Here, the statement is not being offered to prove that John tried to kill Monica, but it instead is being offered to prove that the officer had probable cause to enter the home. Whether John was actually trying to kill Monica is irrelevant to the issue at hand; what matters is whether the officer believed that Monica was in danger and whether it had been necessary to kick down the door to investigate further. Monica's statement is evidence to that effect because a reasonable person having heard Monica's cries for help would fear for her safety.
A person's own prior statements can be hearsay. For example, suppose a person is testifying on the stand. In relation to an automobile accident where a blue truck struck a yellow car, the witness testifies, "I told the police officer the truck was blue" to establish the color of the car (as opposed to whether he had lied to police, or the officer had falsified the witness reports). This statement is an out-of-court statement offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted, and is therefore hearsay. The witness is testifying about what someone said in the past. The fact that it is his own statement does not change the hearsay nature of the statement.
If the witness testifies, "The truck that struck the yellow car was blue," the statement is not hearsay. The witness is not testifying about a past statement. He is not relating in court what someone outside of court said, but is merely relating an observation.
The rule that a person's own statements can be considered hearsay may be confusing. By "forgetting" who is testifying on the stand and merely looking for statements like "I said," "I wrote," "I testified before that," "The document says," and the like, most confusion can be eliminated.
In this example, simple logic tells that there is a difference: while the first statement may be true, it does not assert anything about the truth of the matter stated. The witness may have told the officer that the truck was blue, but that may not have been the truth; he might have been mistaken or lying.

[edit]Non-hearsay under the Federal Rules

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, two broad categories of statements are exempt from the rule's general definition. These are referred to as hearsay “exemptions” and are of two types:

[edit]Admission by a party-opponent

An admission by a party-opponent is a statement offered against another party that meets one of five criteria:
  1. The party against whom the statement is being offered is also the declarant of that statement either personally or in a representative capacity.
  2. The party against whom the statement is being offered manifested an adoption or belief in the statement's truth.
  3. The party against whom the statement is being offered authorized the declarant to make the statement.
  4. The statement is made by an agent of the party against whom it is being offered and concerns a matter within the scope of the employment and is made during the course of that employment.
  5. The declarant was a co-conspirator of the party against whom the statement is being offered and the statement is in furtherance of their conspiracy.
The theory underlying this “exemption” is derived from the nature of the hearsay rule itself. The hearsay rule operates to exclude extrajudicial assertions as untrustworthy because they cannot be tested by cross-examination. When an assertion is offered into evidence against the defendant and the defendant objects, “hearsay,” the defendant is in essence saying “I object to this statement as untrustworthy because I am not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the person who made it. How can we trust what he said?” But what if the defendant is the person who made the statement that is now being offered against him? To object, “hearsay” in this circumstance would be as absurd as to argue, “This statement is unreliable because I cannot cross-examine myself; therefore, how can I trust what I said?” In this situation the objection of the Hearsay rule falls away, because the very basis of the rule is lacking, viz. the need and prudence of affording an opportunity of cross-examination. Another way of looking at it is that a defendant who faces his own statement being used against him has an opportunity to cross-examine himself – he can take the witness stand and explain his prior assertion, so the rule is satisfied.

[edit]Prior statement of a witness

A prior statement is not hearsay if the person who made the statement (the "declarant") is currently testifying and is subject to cross-examination at the current trial/hearing/proceeding/deposition, and
  • (A) the prior statement is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony at the current trial/hearing/proceeding/deposition and the prior statement was given under oath at a prior trial/hearing/proceeding/deposition—in which case it may be used both for impeachment and substantively; or
  • (B) the prior statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony, and is offered to rebut a charge that the declarant has made a recent fabrication, or a charge of the declarant's improper influence or motive, i.e. the declarant's biasor
  • (C) the prior statement was an identification of a person made after perceiving that person.[5]

[edit]Exceptions

Some statements are defined as hearsay, but may nevertheless be admissible as evidence in court. These statements relate to exceptions to the general rule on hearsay. Some (but not all) exceptions to the hearsay rule apply only when the declarant is unavailable for testimony at the trial or hearing.
Many of the exceptions listed below are treated more extensively in individual articles.

[edit]Exceptions where the declarant's availability is irrelevant

  1. Excited utterances: Statements relating to startling events or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.[6] This is the exception that may apply to the 'police officer' scenario listed above. The victim's cries of help were made under the stress of a startling event, and the victim is still under the stress of the event, as is evidenced by the victim's crying and visible shaking. An excited utterance does not have to be made at the same time of the startling event. A statement made minutes, hours or even days after the startling event can be excited utterances, so long as the declarant is still under the stress of the startling event. However, the more time that elapses between a startling event and the declarant's statement, the more the statements will be looked upon with disfavor.
  2. Present sense impression: A statement expressing the declarant's impression of a condition existing at the time the statement was made, such as "it's hot in here", or "we're going really fast". Unlike an excited utterance, it need not be made in response to a startling event. Instead, it is admissible because it is a condition that the witness would likely have been experiencing at the same time as the declarant, and would instantly be able to corroborate.
  3. Declarations of present state of mind: Much like a present-sense impression describes the outside world, declarant's statement to the effect of "I am angry!" or "I am Napoleon!" will be admissible to prove that the declarant was indeed angry, or did indeed believe himself to be Napoleon at that time. Used in cases where the declarant's mental state is at issue. Present-state-of-mind statements are also used as circumstantial evidence of subsequent acts committed by the declarant, like his saying, "I'm gonna go buy some groceries and get the oil changed in my car on my way home from work." Another exception is statements made in the course of medical treatment, i.e., statements made by a patient to a medical professional to help in diagnosis and treatment. Any statements contained therein that attribute fault or causation to an individual will generally NOT be admissible under this exception.
  4. the business records exception: business records created during the ordinary course of business are considered reliable and can usually be brought in under this exception if the proper foundation is laid when the records are introduced into evidence. Depending on which jurisdiction the case is in, either the records custodian or someone with knowledge of the records must lay a foundation for the records, however. The use of police records, especially as substantive evidence against the accused in a criminal trial, is severely restricted under the Business Records exception. Typically, only generalized evidence about police procedure is admissible under this exception, and not facts about a specific case. For example, John is stopped for speeding 70 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone. The officer, who determined John's speed with radar, records the speed in an incident report. He also calibrates and runs a diagnostic on his radar every day prior to beginning his shift. He records this in a log. At trial, the report itself would not be admissible as it pertained to the facts of the case. However, the officer's daily log in which he records his calibration and the daily diagnostics of his radar unit would be admissible under the business records exception.
  5. prior inconsistent statements: Many states have departed from the approach of the federal rules with respect to inconsistent statements. Under current law in these jurisdictions, a prior inconsistent statement made by a witness (even when not made under oath at a judicial proceeding or deposition) is admissible as substantive evidence provided the declarant signed the statement.[7]
  6. Other exceptions, declarant's availability immaterial:In the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, separate exceptions are made for public recordsfamily records, and records in ancient documents of established authenticity. When regular or public records are kept, theabsence of such records may also be used as admissible hearsay evidence.

[edit]Exceptions where the declarant must be unavailable

  • dying declarations and other statements under belief of impending death: often depicted in movies; the police officer asks the person on his deathbed, "Who attacked you?" and the victim replies, "The butler did it." In reality, case law has ruled out this exception in criminal law, because the witness should always be cross examined in court; however, there is an exception to this exception for criminal cases: even though generally inadmissible to matters relating to criminal law, the exception has been carved out for actions relating to homicide cases[Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2)].
  • declaration against interest: A statement that would incriminate or expose the declarant to liability to such an extent that it can be assumed he would only make such a statement if it were true. It would be assumed that one would lie to further one's interests, so a statement against his interests (such as exposing oneself to criminal or civil liability) likely would not be made unless it were true.[8]
  • prior testimony: if the testimony was given under oath and the party against whom the testimony is being proffered was present and had the opportunity to cross examine the witness at that time. Often used to enter depositions into the court record at trial.
  • admission of guilt: if you make a statement, verbal or otherwise, as an admission of guilt of the matter at hand, that statement would not be regarded as hearsay. In other words, self-incriminating statements (confessions) are not hearsay. Unlike in "declarations against interest," the declarant need not be unavailable.[9]
  • forfeiture by wrongdoing: the party against whom the statement is now offered (1) intentionally made the declarant unavailable; (2) with intent to prevent declarant's testimony; (3) by wrongdoing.

[edit]Theories supporting exceptions

In some jurisdictions, such as Canada, the limited exceptions format to the rule have been replaced by a more general theory of exceptions to the hearsay rule that allows courts to decide when documents, testimony or other evidentiary proof can be used that might not otherwise be considered.
The underlying rationale for many of the hearsay exceptions is that the circumstances of a particular statement make them reliable enough to be heard by a trier of fact. Statements made during the course of medical treatment, for example, are considered reliable because patients typically have little reason to lie to a doctor while they are being treated, and will generally be accurate in describing their ailments.
This, of course, is not always true. Patients do sometimes lie to their doctors (to get painkillers to which they are not entitled, for example). Hearsay exceptions do not mandate that a trier of fact (the jury or, in non-jury trials, the judge) accept the hearsay statement as being true. Hearsay exceptions mean only that the trier of fact will be informed of the hearsay statement and will be allowed to consider it when deciding on a verdict in the case. The jury is free to disregard a hearsay statement if the jury does not believe it. The hearsay rule controls only what out-of-court statements a trier of fact gets to consider in deciding a case, not how they consider the out-of-court statements.

[edit]References

  1. ^ ""Hearsay" Evidence"Findlaw for the Public. Retrieved 2008-01-31.
  2. ^ Rule 801, 28 U.S.C. App. See Rule for Courts-Martial 801, Manual for Court Martial, United States (2005 ed.)
  3. ^ Wigmore on Evidence §1360
  4. ^ FRE 801(a)
  5. ^ F.R.E."F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A)-(C)"Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute. Retrieved February 14, 2012.
  6. ^ Garner, Brian A., Editor in Chief, (1999). Black's Law Dictionary (7 ed.). St. Paul, MN USA: West Publishing. p. 585. ISBN 0314199500.
  7. ^ Seee.g.Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66 (Pa. 1986). Although proposed on numerous occasions, this exception has not been adopted in federal court.
  8. ^ FRE 804(b)(3)
  9. ^ FRE 801(d)(2)(A)

[edit]External links


Teachers' Manual to Green, Nesson & Murray, Problems, Cases and Materials on Evidence, 3rd Edition.
INTRODUCTION
This teacher's manual is designed to assist colleagues who use the materials collected, arranged, and discussed in the 3rd Edition of Problems, Cases and Materials on Evidence as a textbook in a basic 3 or 4 semester/hour basic course on Evidence. Colleagues' attention is drawn to the Green, Nesson & Murray Evidence Web Site (www.law.harvard.edu/publications/evidenceiii/index.html) which contains all of the contents of the 3rd Edition, this teachers' manual, the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence with Advisory Committee Notes, and an abundance of other evidence material.
The numbers after the titles of cases, problems and other materials referred to in this teachers' manual are the page number in the 3rd Edition at which the material referred to is to be found.
The suggestions of the authors about how the selected materials in the casebook should be understood or taught are not intended to be definitive. The materials are rich enough to support a number of didactic points or perspectives for reflection. Colleagues should consider the authors' suggestions and points of departure for development of their own pedagogy from these materials. The authors welcome colleagues' feedback, ideas and suggestions on the materials in the 3rd edition and on the web site, and on this teacher's manual.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
December 2000
Contents of Teacher's Manual
Chapter I:  Relevance
 Contents
 Introduction (1)
 A. Materiality (3)
 B. Logical Relevance (16)
 C. Conditional Relevance (28)
 D. Prejudice and Probative Value (50)
 E. Problems in Circumstantial Proof (69)
 F. Probability and Statistical Proof (93)
 Appendix
Chapter II: Categorical Rules of Evidence
 Contents
 A. Subsequent Remedial Measures (132)
 B. Settlement Offers and Payment of Medical Expenses (144)
 C. Pleas and Related Statements (150)
 D. Proof of Insurance (158)
Chapter III: Evidence of Character
 Contents
 Introduction (171)
A. The Propensity Rule (174)
 B. Exceptions to the Propensity Rule (235)
 C. Character and Habit (266)
 D. Character Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases (274)
Chapter IV: Competency, Examination, and Credibility of Witnesses
 Contents
 A. Competency of Witnesses (330)
 B. Form and Scope of Examination of Witnesses (360)
 C. Cross Examination and Witnes Credibility (363)
 D. Impeachment by Character Evidence (371)
Chapter V: Hearsay
 Contents
 A. The Rules Against Hearsay (407)
 B. Statements of a Party Opponent (427)
 C. Prior Statements of a Witness (452)
 D. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule-- Declarant Unavailable (464)
 E. Hearsay Exceptions-- Availability of Declarant Immaterial (474)
 F. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule-- The "Residuary Exception" (503)
Chapter VI: Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause
 Contents
 Introduction (559)
 Chapter 6
Chapter VII: Privileges
 Contents
 A. Priviledges in General (601)
 B. The Lawyer-Client Priviledge (618)
 C. The Lawyer-Client Priviledge in the Corporate Context (679)
 D. The Psychotherapist- Patient Priviledge (710)
 E. The Husband-Wife Priviledge (734)
Chapter VIII: Opinions, Scientific Proof, and Expert Testimony
 Contents
 A. Lay Opinions (754) 
 B. Law Opinions (766) 
 C. Expert Testimony, Scientific Proof, and Junk Science (771) 
 D. Court Appointed Experts (922) 
Chapter IX: Authentication and Identification: Writings, Photographs, Voices, and Real Evidence
 Contents
 A. Authentication (946)
 B. The "Best Evidence" Rule (982)
Chapter X: Allocation, Inference, Burdens, and Presumptions
 Contents
 Introduction (1019)
 A. Allocation in Civil Cases (1021)
 B. Inference and Speculation: What is the Difference Between Reasoning and Guessing? (1028)
 C. Strategies for Bridging the Gap (1031)
 D. Civil Presumptions and Rule 301 (1032)
 E. Allocation and Presumption in Criminal Cases (1075)
 F. Criminal Presumptions: Are There Problems with the Fifth Amendment and the Presumption of Innocence? (1089)
 G. Criminal Presumptions and Rationality (1098)
    


Teachers' Manual to Green, Nesson & Murray, Problems, Cases and Materials on Evidence, 3rd Edition.
INTRODUCTION
This teacher's manual is designed to assist colleagues who use the materials collected, arranged, and discussed in the 3rd Edition of Problems, Cases and Materials on Evidence as a textbook in a basic 3 or 4 semester/hour basic course on Evidence. Colleagues' attention is drawn to the Green, Nesson & Murray Evidence Web Site (www.law.harvard.edu/publications/evidenceiii/index.html) which contains all of the contents of the 3rd Edition, this teachers' manual, the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence with Advisory Committee Notes, and an abundance of other evidence material.
The numbers after the titles of cases, problems and other materials referred to in this teachers' manual are the page number in the 3rd Edition at which the material referred to is to be found.
The suggestions of the authors about how the selected materials in the casebook should be understood or taught are not intended to be definitive. The materials are rich enough to support a number of didactic points or perspectives for reflection. Colleagues should consider the authors' suggestions and points of departure for development of their own pedagogy from these materials. The authors welcome colleagues' feedback, ideas and suggestions on the materials in the 3rd edition and on the web site, and on this teacher's manual.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
December 2000
Contents of Teacher's Manual
Chapter I:  Relevance
 Contents
 Introduction (1)
 A. Materiality (3)
 B. Logical Relevance (16)
 C. Conditional Relevance (28)
 D. Prejudice and Probative Value (50)
 E. Problems in Circumstantial Proof (69)
 F. Probability and Statistical Proof (93)
 Appendix
Chapter II: Categorical Rules of Evidence
 Contents
 A. Subsequent Remedial Measures (132)
 B. Settlement Offers and Payment of Medical Expenses (144)
 C. Pleas and Related Statements (150)
 D. Proof of Insurance (158)
Chapter III: Evidence of Character
 Contents
 Introduction (171)
A. The Propensity Rule (174)
 B. Exceptions to the Propensity Rule (235)
 C. Character and Habit (266)
 D. Character Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases (274)
Chapter IV: Competency, Examination, and Credibility of Witnesses
 Contents
 A. Competency of Witnesses (330)
 B. Form and Scope of Examination of Witnesses (360)
 C. Cross Examination and Witnes Credibility (363)
 D. Impeachment by Character Evidence (371)
Chapter V: Hearsay
 Contents
 A. The Rules Against Hearsay (407)
 B. Statements of a Party Opponent (427)
 C. Prior Statements of a Witness (452)
 D. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule-- Declarant Unavailable (464)
 E. Hearsay Exceptions-- Availability of Declarant Immaterial (474)
 F. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule-- The "Residuary Exception" (503)
Chapter VI: Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause
 Contents
 Introduction (559)
 Chapter 6
Chapter VII: Privileges
 Contents
 A. Priviledges in General (601)
 B. The Lawyer-Client Priviledge (618)
 C. The Lawyer-Client Priviledge in the Corporate Context (679)
 D. The Psychotherapist- Patient Priviledge (710)
 E. The Husband-Wife Priviledge (734)
Chapter VIII: Opinions, Scientific Proof, and Expert Testimony
 Contents
 A. Lay Opinions (754) 
 B. Law Opinions (766) 
 C. Expert Testimony, Scientific Proof, and Junk Science (771) 
 D. Court Appointed Experts (922) 
Chapter IX: Authentication and Identification: Writings, Photographs, Voices, and Real Evidence
 Contents
 A. Authentication (946)
 B. The "Best Evidence" Rule (982)
Chapter X: Allocation, Inference, Burdens, and Presumptions
 Contents
 Introduction (1019)
 A. Allocation in Civil Cases (1021)
 B. Inference and Speculation: What is the Difference Between Reasoning and Guessing? (1028)
 C. Strategies for Bridging the Gap (1031)
 D. Civil Presumptions and Rule 301 (1032)
 E. Allocation and Presumption in Criminal Cases (1075)
 F. Criminal Presumptions: Are There Problems with the Fifth Amendment and the Presumption of Innocence? (1089)
 G. Criminal Presumptions and Rationality (1098)
    


CHAPTER IV: Competency, Examination, and Credibility of Witnesses
Go to:Teacher's Manual IntroductionChapter 4 ContentsNext Section
B. Form and Scope of Examination of Witnesses (360)
Answer and Analysis:
The problem with this examination is that no foundation has been laid identifying the witness. The examiner should first establish that the witness is the plaintiff in the action, that the witness is acquainted with D, the defendant in the action, and that the witness is familiar with the scene of the accident. In addition, "Where were you on June 1?" is vague because it is not sufficiently specific as to time. The witness was at many different places on June 1.
The problems with "Did defendant drive his car into you on June 1?" is that there is no foundation showing first-hand knowledge and the question is leading. The most difficult technical aspect of direct examination is to elicit the witness's story without leading, on the one hand, and without asking questions which call for a narrative on the other. Typical non-leading nonnarrative questions are of the who-what-when-where variety.
A better examination might go something like this:
"What is your name?"
"Where do you live?"
"Where were you on June 1, at approximately 2:30 p.m?"
"What were you doing, then?"
"Where were you going?"
"What did you do as you approached the roadway?"
"What did you do next?"
"What happened as you stepped into the road?"


Answer and Analysis:
The question is leading. A leading question might be permissible at the outset of an examination dealing with matters which are not crucial for purposes of setting the stage. But on the crucial points of a direct examination leading questions are objectionable.
Proper questions would be:
"What happened when you returned from the store?"
"What did you see."


Problem - Direct and Cross-Examination: High Sticking (362)
The point:
The rules regarding the form of examination are guidelines only. Sometimes leading is allowed on direct and not on cross.
Answer and analysis:
(1) "Mr. D. struck you with this didn't he?"
Ordinarily this question would be objectionable because it is leading. However FRE 611(c)'s rule against leading on direct examination is suggestive rather than absolute. The trial judge has a wide range of discretion and control over this area. The advisory Committee's Note lists many exceptions to the general rule against leading on direct including situations where the witness's recollection is exhausted. Once a witness's recollection is exhausted or he otherwise gets stuck counsel may be permitted to lead but he should do so only after asking permission and then only to the minimum amount necessary to get the witness unstuck.
(2) "It was the defendant, D, who struck him wasn't it?"
Boor is the first defense witness. (Ignore his also being the second witness at D's trial.) Ordinarily, as cross-examination the question would be completely permissible. However in this case Boor as a local may be a hostile witness or a witness identified with an adverse party (FRE 611(c)) permitting the defense to treat Boor as if on cross but requiring the prosecution to question him as if on direct. The point is that proponents of witnesses should not be allowed to shield their witness's infirmities behind carefully constructed leading question. Leading questions are not objectionable because they suggest the answer (although that is a way to recognize them); most direct examinations are done with witnesses whom the lawyer has prepared and thus to whom all sorts of suggestions may have been made. Rather the purpose of the rule is to have the witness tell the story in a manner that exposes the witness's testimonial capacities. This is best done when the witness has to formulate an answer to an open-ended question.
More acceptable would have been:
"Who struck O'Casey?"
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Federal Partial Final Judgments

By Thomas R. Newman and Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr.
November 3, 2004
New York Law Journal
This month, we examine Computech International, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp.,1 which contains an excellent discussion of partial final judgments pursuant to Rule 54[b] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [FedRCivP] ["Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties"].
Computech arose out of a commercial dispute between Compaq as supplier and CTI as buyer of computer equipment. In a prior order, the district court [1] granted Compaq's motion under FedRCivP 56 to dismiss CTI's amended complaint alleging fraud, libel and breach of contract to the extent of dismissing CTI's contract claim against Compaq and [2] granted summary judgment to Compaq on its contract counterclaims against CTI. The court stated, "If either party desires certification of the claims adjudicated to date pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54[b], a motion to that effect shall be brought within ten [10] days of the entry of this opinion and order."2 Compaq moved for entry of judgment on the counterclaims pursuant to Rule 54[b].
By way of background, in most instances only a "final decision" of the district court -- "one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment"3 -- is appealable to the court of appeals as a matter of right [28 USC §[1292[a]]. Certain interlocutory orders and partial final judgments are immediately appealable, however, either as a matter of right or as a matter of judicial discretion.
Interlocutory orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions" and certain orders in receivership and admiralty proceedings are appealable as of right [28 USC §[1292[a]]. Other interlocutory orders are appealable only if the district court certifies that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation" and "[t]he Court of Appeals * * * thereupon, in its discretion, permit[s] an appeal to be taken from such order" [28 USC §[1292[b]]. In an action involving multiple claims or multiple parties, an order disposing of fewer than all claims against all parties is not appealable as a final decision under 28 USC §[1291 unless the district court certifies that "there is no just reason for delay" and directs the entry of a partial final judgment [FedRCivP 54[b]].
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized these basic principles of federal appellate jurisdiction in Chappel v. Levinsky.4
When the decision of the district court does not pertain to an injunction, a receivership, or a case in admiralty, see 28 USC §[1292[a] [1988], and is not an interlocutory order as to which we have granted leave to appeal, see 28 USC §[1292[b] [1988], the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal unless the decision is a 'final' order within the meaning of 28 USC §[1291 [1988]. An order that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims remaining in the action or adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties is not a final order unless the court directs the entry of a final judgment as to the dismissed claims or parties 'upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.' FedRCivP 54[b].
Rule 54[b] Certification Factors
Rule 54[b] provides in pertinent part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
Thus, Rule 54[b] requires that "[1] multiple claims or multiple parties must be present, [2] at least one claim, or the rights and liabilities of at least one party, must be finally decided within the meaning of 28 USC §[1291 and [3] the district court must make 'an express determination that there is no just reason for delay' and expressly direct the clerk to enter judgment."5 With respect to appellate review of a district court's entry of a partial final judgment, "Because '[f]actors [1] and [2] address the issue of whether rule 54[b] applies at all to the circumstances of the case,' they are reviewed de novo. 'Factor [3], on the other hand, is addressed to the ultimate decision to direct the entry of judgment; given the permissive nature of [R]ule 54[b] ..., this decision is left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court and is to be exercised in the interest of sound judicial administration.' "6
In Computech, Judge Robert W. Sweet analyzed the discretionary factors that guide the district court's determination whether to direct the entry of a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54[b], as well as the requirements for a proper certification:
Once the application of Rule 54[b] to the circumstances of the case has been established, the question of whether to direct entry of judgment is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, seeGinett, 962 F2d at 1092, although it "must be considered in light of the goal of judicial economy as served by the 'historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.' " O'Bert ex rel. Estate of O'Bert v. Vargo, 331 F3d 29, 41 [2d Cir. 2003] [quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 US 1, 8 [1980]] [internal quotation marks omitted]. "[I]t does not suffice for the district court to announce its determination that 'there is no just cause for delay' in conclusory form. Rather, its certification must be accompanied by a reasoned, even if brief, explanation of its conclusion." Id.; see also Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., 947 F2d 627, 629 [2d Cir. 1991]; Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dept. of Navy, 891 F2d 414, 419 [2d Cir. 1989].
In reaching a reasoned conclusion, "[t]he proper guiding star, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, is 'the interest of sound judicial administration.' " Ginett, 962 F2d at 1095 [quoting Curtiss-Wright, 446 US at 8]. "[N]ow that the garden variety civil complaint often involves multiple claims and/or multiple parties, we cannot, as the Supreme Court has recognized, hide behind the old 'infrequent harsh case' chestnut" previously used to limit the application of Rule 54[b]. Id. With the interest of sound judicial administration as the goal,
Only those claims "inherently inseparable" from or "inextricably interrelated" to each other are inappropriate for rule 54[b] certification. When the claims are "separable" or "extricable" from each other, there is generally no reason to disturb the district court's exercise of its discretion. Ginett, 962 F2d at 1096; see, e.g., Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, 891 F2d at 418 [concluding that the certification of a judgment on certain claims was proper where the claims "involve a unique factual scenario ... and raise legal issues wholly distinct from those that remain for trial" and "any subsequent appeals on the remaining claims ... will involve questions of fact and law entirely distinct" from those at stake in the certified claims].7
Interrelatedness of Claims
Judge Sweet observed that multiple claims were at stake in the Computech litigation and that the grant of summary judgment on Compaq's counterclaims qualified as a final decision for purposes of Rule 54[b], thereby satisfying the first and second Rule 54[b] factors. CTI argued that the entry of judgment should be denied, however, because the issues underlying Compaq's counterclaims were "inextricably intertwined" with CTI's claims for fraud and libel against Compaq, both of which survived Compaq's summary judgment motion. The court disagreed, noting that "the factual and legal issues raised by CTI's fraud and libel claims are unrelated to Compaq's counterclaims. CTI's fraud and libel claims 'are not related to whether CTI owes Compaq money for goods CTI admits it received and resold.' " The court noted that "inseparability" of claims, not "mere interrelatedness," was the test for denial of Rule 54[b] certification:
The mere interrelatedness of claims does not connote their inseparability. As the Court of Appeals for this circuit explained in Ginett, if the interrelatedness present in multiparty and multiclaim cases were sufficient to render claims inextricably interwoven, then "every multiparty case [and virtually every multiclaim case] would elude the entry of a rule 54[b] judgment, and rule 54[b] would be meaningless."8
Next, CTI argued that Rule 54[b] certification should be denied because it may have claims for damages against Compaq that would offset any judgment entered in Compaq's favor. The court rejected this argument, noting once again that "CTI's claims are not related to whether CTI owes Compaq money for goods CTI admits it received and resold" and, thus, "the grounds for the potential setoff bear no relation to the substance of Compaq's counterclaims."9
Finally, noting that Compaq is a "multi-million dollar company with global operations," CTI argued that a delay in entering judgment would not cause financial hardship to either party. The court treated this factor as neutral in weighing the equities involved. If anything, the court observed, "CTI's allegations of Compaq's solvency suggest that CTI's concerns regarding potential offset damages are unwarranted, as there is no reason to believe that Compaq will be unable to pay any such damages should judgment on CTI's remaining claims be entered in CTI's favor."10
The same considerations led the court to deny CTI's cross-motion pursuant to FedRCivP 62[h] for a stay of enforcement of any Rule 54[b] judgment entered on Compaq's counterclaims, pending the trial of CTI's surviving fraud and libel claims. The court held that no grounds for a Rule 62[h] stay had been established since "CTI has alleged that Compaq is not in danger of becoming insolvent and, thus, there is no basis for concluding here that CTI would be unable to collect any damages that CTI may have in excess of the amount of the judgment on Compaq's counterclaims."11
  1. 2004 WL 2291496 [SDNY, Oct. 12, 2004 [Sweet, U.S.D.J.]].
  2. 2004 WL 1126320, *13 [SDNY, May 21, 2004 [Sweet, U.S.D.J.]].
  3. Catlin v. United States, 324 US 229, 233 [1945].
  4. 961 F2d 372, 373 [2d Cir. 1992].
  5. Ginett v. Computer Task Group Inc., 962 F2d 1085, 1091 [2d Cir. 1992].
  6. Information Resources, Inc. v. Dun and Bradstreet Corp., 294 F3d 447, 451 [2d Cir. 2002] [citations omitted].
  7. 2004 WL 2291496, *1-*2 [SDNY]
  8. Id. at *2-*3, citing Ginett, supra, 962 F2d at 1095-96.
  9. Id. at *3-*4.
  10. Id. at *4.
  11. Id. at *5.
Thomas R. Newman is of counsel to Duane Morris and author of New York Appellate Practice [Matthew Bender]. Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr. is a partner at Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt. They are both members of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers.
This article originally appeared in the New York Law Journal and is republished here with permission from law.com.

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