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2013년 5월 7일 화요일


per·mis·sive

  [per-mis-iv]  Show IPA
adjective
1.
habitually or characteristically accepting or tolerant of something, as social behavior or linguisticusage, that others might disapprove or forbid.
2.
granting or denoting permissiona permissive nod.
3.
4.
Genetics. (of a cell) permitting replication of a strand of DNA that could be lethal, as a viral segmentor mutant gene.
Origin: 
1425–75; late Middle English;  see permission-ivecompare French permissif

per·mis·sive·ly, adverb
per·mis·sive·ness, noun
non·per·mis·sive, adjective
non·per·mis·sive·ly, adverb
non·per·mis·sive·ness, noun


1. indulgent, lenient, lax.
Dictionary.com Unabridged
Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2013.
Cite This Source   Link To permissive
00:06
Permissive is always a great word to know.
So is quincunx. Does it mean:
a calculus or concretion found in the stomach or intestines of certain animals, esp. ruminants, formerly reputed to be an effective remedy for poison.
an arrangement of five objects, as trees, in a square or rectangle, one at each corner and one in the middle.
Collins
World English Dictionary
permissive  (pəˈmɪsɪv) [Click for IPA pronunciation guide]
 
— adj
1.tolerant; lenient: permissive parents
2.indulgent in matters of sex: a permissive society
3.granting permission
4.archaic  not obligatory
 
per'missively
 
— adv
 
per'missiveness
 
— n
Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition
2009 © William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1979, 1986 © HarperCollins
Publishers 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009
Cite This Source
Etymonline
Word Origin & History

permissive 
c.1600, "allowing to pass through," from O.Fr. permissif, from L. permissus (see permission). In sense of"tolerant, liberal" it is first recorded 1956; by 1966 it had definite overtones of sexual freedom.
Online Etymology Dictionary, © 2010 Douglas Harper
Cite This Source

Estoppel by deed

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Estoppel by deed is a doctrine where rules of evidence prevent a litigant from denying the truth of what was said or done.[1]
In the context of real property transfers, the grantor of a deed (generally the seller of a piece of real property) is estopped (barred) from denying the truth of the deed. The doctrine may only be invoked in a suit arising out of the deed, or involving a particular right arising out of the deed.[2]
In contract law this can refer to a representation in the recitals to an agreement. Once the agreement is made, one party may claim that the other party cannot enforce certain rights under the agreement due to representations made in the recitals.

[edit]Examples

1. If O conveys property she doesn't own to A by warranty deed, but O later acquires title to that land, then title immediately passes to A.
2. However, if, as above, O conveys property she doesn't own to A by warranty deed, but O later acquires title to that land, A may elect to treat O's lack of title at the time of the conveyance as a breach of the covenants of seisin and right to convey (two of the six traditional forms of Covenants for Title that are contained in a general warranty deed), and sue O for damages. A cannot be forced to accept O's after-acquired title if she wishes instead to receive damages.[3][4]
3. If O conveys property she doesn't own to A by quitclaim deed, but O later acquires title to that land, then A owns nothing. This is because O passed her interest to A with a quitclaim deed; at the time of the conveyance, O's interest was nothing, so she passed nothing.

[edit]References

  1. ^ Wallace v. Pruitt, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 234, 20 S.W. 728, 728 (1892): "That the maker of a deed may be estopped to deny the truth of recitals therein is a well-settled doctrine of the common law."
  2. ^ W. E. Coldwell Co. v. Cowart, 138 Ga. 233, 75 S.E. 425, 427 (1912), citing 16 Cyc. 699: "A recital works an estoppel only in an action founded on a deed, or brought to enforce rights arising under it."
  3. ^ King v. Gilson's Adm'x, 32 Ill. 348, 354-55 (1863): "The covenants of seizin and of good right to convey are broken, if at all, when the deed is delivered. They are personal covenants, not running with the land, and are in presenti. Their breach depends upon no future contingency. They are, that the grantor is then seized, and has good right to convey. If he is not well seized, or if he has not the power to convey, when the deed is delivered, an action at once accrues, and a recovery may be had."
  4. ^ Reece v. Smith, 276 Ga. 404, 406, 577 S.E.2d 583, 586 (2003), citing Yaali, Ltd. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 269 Ga. 695, 697(2), 506 S.E.2d 116 (1998): "[A] grantor who conveys by warranty deed an interest that he does not then own, but later acquires, will be estopped to deny the validity of the first deed. It is generally understood, however, that this doctrine cannot be used to transfer title or to cure flaws in the legal requirements for the creation of a property interest."
Chapter 14

FUTURE INTERESTS HELD BY THE TRANSFEREE

§ 14.01 An Intricate Common Law Maze [166-167]

The common law principles governing future interests held by transferees are extraordinarily complex, reflecting the internal tensions of post-feudal English society.  The maze of rules that resulted from centuries of legal struggle can be described as a compromise: future interests in transferees were permitted, but restricted.

§ 14.02 Classifying Future Interests Held by the Transferee [167-168]

The common law recognized only two broad categories of future interests that could be held by a transferee: the remainder and the executory interest.  There are four types of remainders and two types of executory interests.

§ 14.03 Remainders [168-175]

                        [A]       Definition

A remainder is a future interest created in a transferee that is capable of becoming possessory upon the natural termination of a prior estate created by the same instrument.  For example, if A conveys “to B for life, and then to C,” C’s interest is capable of becoming possessory when the prior estate (B’s life estate) naturally terminates; C holds a remainder.

                        [B]       Types of Remainders

                                                [1]        Vested Remainders

The three types of vested remainders are: the indefeasibly vested remainder; the vested remainder subject to divestment; and the vested remainder subject to open.  All three vested remainders are (a) created in a living, ascertainable person and (b) not subject to any condition precedent except the natural termination of the prior estate.  The indefeasibly vested remainder is certain to become a possessory estate; for example, if A conveys “to B for life, and then to C,” C (or C’s successor) will clearly be entitled to possession upon B’s death.  In contrast, the vested remainder subject to divestment is certain to become possessory unless some specified event occurs (e.g, “to B for life, then to C, but if C ever smokes a cigar, then to D).  Finally, the vested remainder subject to open is held by one or more ascertainable members of a class that may be enlarged by the future addition of presently unascertainable persons.

                                                [2]        Contingent Remainders

 The contingent remainder, in contrast, is either (a) created in an unascertainable person or (b) subject to a condition precedent.  For example, suppose A conveys “to B for life, and then to C if C graduates from law school.”  C’s remainder is contingent because she must first satisfy a condition precedent (graduating from law school) before she is eligible to take possession following B’s death.

§ 14.04 Executory Interests [176-178]

                        [A]       Definition

An executory interest is a future interest created in a transferee that must “cut short” or “divest” another estate or interest in order to become a possessory estate.  For example, if A conveys property “to A, but if B returns from France, then to B,” A has a form of fee simple that may potentially endure forever; in order to become a possessory estate, B’s interest must cut short A’s fee simple, so B has an executory interest.

                        [B]       Types of Executory Interests

It is traditional to distinguish between the shifting executory interest (one that divests the transferee) and the springing executory interest (one that divests the transferor).  However, this distinction has no legal significance.

§ 14.05 Consequences of the Distinction Between Remainders and Executory Interests  [178-179]

At common law, the distinction was important.  For example, the Rule in Shelley’s Case applied to remainders, but not to executory interests.  Today, however, there is little legal difference between the two interests in most jurisdictions.

§ 14.06 Creation of Interests [179]

The remainder or executory interest in real property can arise only through express language in a valid deed or will, not through implication. 

§ 14.07 Transfer of Interests [179-180]

Remainders and executory interests may be freely transferred in most states.  However, some states still insist that contingent remainders and executory interests cannot be transferred by an inter vivos conveyance. 

§ 14.08 Other Rights of Interest Holders [181-182]

The holder of a vested remainder still has somewhat greater rights than the owner of a contingent remainder or executory interest in two areas: remedies for waste and shares in eminent domain proceeds.

§ 14.09 Four Special Restrictions on Contingent Future Interests Held by Transferees [182-183]

The common law recognized four doctrines designed to restrict contingent future interests held by transferees: the Rule Against Perpetuities; the Doctrine of Worthier Title; the Rule in Shelley’s Case; and the destructibility of contingent remainders.

§ 14.10 The Rule Against Perpetuities: At Common Law [183-194]

                        [A]       The Rule in Context

The common law version of the Rule is: “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”  To comply with the Rule, it must be logically provable that within the specified period a covered contingent interest will either vest (that is, change into a vested interest or present estate) or forever fail to vest (that is, never vest after the period ends), based only on facts existing when the future interest becomes effective.

                        [B]       Application of the Rule

For example, assume O conveys “to A for life, then to the first child of A to reach age 30.”  Assume that A is alive when the conveyance takes effect, but that A has never had children.  A potential unborn child (A’s first child to reach age 30) receives a contingent remainder under this language, which is a type of interest subject to the Rule.  It cannot be logically proven that this interest is valid.  For instance, A might have a child, B, one year after the conveyance; suppose O and A then die.  Twenty-nine years later, if B survives, her contingent remainder will “vest” by becoming a present estate.  B’s interest is deemed invalid under the Rule—at the time of O’s conveyance—because such vesting would come too late (more than 21 years after O and A, the lives in being, died). 

§ 14.11 The Rule Against Perpetuities: Modern Reforms [194-197]

Most states have modified the common law Rule by: (1) adopting a “wait and see” approach (that is, waiting until the end of the relevant period to see if the interest in fact vested or forever failed to vest); and/or (2) permitting reformation to validate the interest if consistent with the transferor’s intent.

§ 14.12 The Doctrine of Worthier Title [197-198]

Traditionally, if an owner transferred real property to one party, and by the same instrument transferred the following remainder or executory interest to the owner’s heirs, then, under this doctrine, the owner received a reversion and the “heirs” received nothing.  Today the doctrine is virtually obsolete in the United States.

§ 14.13 The Rule in Shelley’s Case [198-199]

Under this rule, if a deed or will (1) created a life estate or fee tail in real property in one person and (2) also created a remainder in fee simple in that person’s heirs, and (3) the estate and remainder were both legal or both equitable, then the future interest belonged to that person, not the person’s “heirs.”  This rule has been abolished in all but two states.

§ 14.14 The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders [199-200]

At common law, a legal contingent remainder in real property was extinguished if it failed to vest when the preceding freehold estate ended.  Today almost all states have abandoned this doctrine.



An assignment is a term used with similar meanings in the law of contracts and in the law of real estate. In both instances, it encompasses the transfer of rights held by one party – the assignor – to another party – the assignee. The legal nature of the assignment determines some additional rights and liabilities that accompany the act.
Assignment of contract rights
Assignment of rights under a contract is the complete transfer of the rights to receive the benefits accruing to one of the parties to that contract. For example, if party A contracts to wash party B’s car for $10, party A can later assign the benefits of the contract – the right to be paid $10 – to party C. In this scenario, party A has become the assignor, party B has become an obligor, and party C is the assignee. Such an assignment may be donative (essentially given as a gift), or it may be contractually exchanged for consideration. It is important to note, however, that party C is not a third party beneficiary, because the contract itself was not made for the purpose of benefitting party C.
When assignment will be permitted
The common law favors the freedom of assignment, so an assignment will generally be permitted unless there is an express prohibition against assignment in the contract. Where assignment is thus permitted, the assignor need not consult the other party to the contract. An assignment can not have any effect on the duties of the other party to the contract, nor can it reduce the possibility of the other party receiving full performance of the same quality. Certain kinds of performance, therefore, can not be assigned, because they create a unique relationship between the parties to the contract. For example, if party A contracts to hire an attorney to represent party A in a civil case for a fee of $1000, party A can not then assign his contractual right to legal representation to another party.
Requirements for an effective assignment
For assignment to be effective, it must occur in the present. No specific language is required to make such an assignment, but the assignor must make some clear statement of intent to assign clearly identified contractual rights to the assignee. A promise to assign in the future has no legal effect. Although this prevents a party from assigning the benefits of a contract that has not yet been made, a court of equity may enforce such an assignment where an established economic relationship between the assignor and the assignee raised an expectation that the assignee would indeed form the appropriate contract in the future.
A contract may contain a non-assignment clause, which prohibits the assignment of specific rights, or of the entire contract, to another. However, such a clause does not necessarily destroy the power of either party to make an assignement. Instead, it merely gives the other party the ability to sue for breach of contract if such an assignment is made. However, an assignment of a contract containing such a clause will be ineffective if the assignee knows of the non-assignment clause, or if the non-assignment clause specifies that “all assignments are void”.
Two other techniques to prevent the assignment of contracts are recission clauses or clauses creating a condition subsequent. The former would give the other party to the contract the power to rescind the contract if an assignment is made; the latter would rescind the contract automatically in such circumstances.
Requirement of a writing
There are certain situations in which the assignment must be in writing.
1. Assignment of wages
2. Assignment of any interest in real property
3. Assignment of choses of action worth over $5,000
4. Assignment as collateral for a loan or debt
Revocability
Assignments made for consideration are irrevocable, meaning that the assignor permanently gives up the legal right take back the assignment once it has been made. Donative assignments, on the other hand, are generally revokable, either by the assignor giving notice to the assignee, taking performance directly from the obligor, or making a subsequent assignment of the same right to another. There are some exceptions to the revocability of a donative assignment:
1. The assignment can not be revoked if the obligor has already performed
2. The assignment can not be revoked if the assignee has received a token chose (chose being derived from the French word for “thing”, as in a chose of action) – a physical object that signifies a right to collect, such as a stock certificate or the passbook to a savings account.
3. The assignment can not be revoked if the assignor has set forth in writing the assignment of a simple chose – a contract right not embodied in any for of token.
4. Estoppel can prevent the revocation of a donative assignment if the asignee changed their position in reliance on the assignment.
Finally, the death or declaration of bankruptcy by the assignor will automatically revoke the assignment by operation of law.
Breach and defenses
A cause of action for breach on the part of the obligor lie with the assignee, who will hold the exclusive right to commence a cause of action for any failure to perform or defective performance. At this stage, because the assignee “stands in the shoes” of the assignor, the obligor can raise any defense to the contract that the obligor could have raised against the assignor. Furthermore, the obligor can raise against the assignee counterclaims and setoffs that the obligor had against the assignor. For example, suppose that A makes a contract to paint B’s house in exchange for $500. A then assigns the right to receive the $500 to C, to pay off a debt owed to C. However, A does such a careless job painting the house that B has to pay another painter $400 to correct A’s work. If C sues B to collect the debt, B can raise his counterclaim for the expenses caused by the poor paint job, and can reduce the amount owed to C by that $400, leaving only $100 to be collected.
When the assignor makes the assignment, he makes with it an implied warranty that the right to assign was not subject to defenses. If the contract had a provision that made the assignment ineffective, the assignee could sue the assignor for breach of this implied warraney. Similarly, the assignee could also sue under this theory if the assignor wrongfully revoked the assignment.
Successive assignments
Occasionally, an unscrupulous assignor will assign the exact same rights to multiple parties (usually for some consideration). In that case, the rights of the assignee depend on the revocability of the assignment, and on the timing of the assignments relative to certain other actions.
In a quirk left over from the common law, if the assigment was donative, the last assignee is the true owner of the rights. However, if the assignment was for consideration, the first assignee to actually collect against the assigned contract is the true owner of the rights. Under the modern American rule, now followed in most U.S. jurisdictions, the first assignor with equity (i.e. the first to have paid for the assignment) will have the strongest claim, while remaining assignees may have other remedies.
1. Earlier donative assignees for whom the assignment was revocable (because it had not been made irrevocable by any of the means listed above) have no cause of action whatsoever.
2. Earlier donative assignees for whom the assignment was made irrevocable can bring an action for the tort of conversion, because the assignment was technically their property when it was given to a later assignee.
3. Later assignees for consideration have a cause of action for breaches of the implied warranty discussed above.
Compare: Delegation
A parallel concept to assignment is delegation, which occurs when one party transfers his duties or liabilities under a contract to another. A delegation and an assignment can be accomplished at the same time, although a non-assignment clause also bars delegation.

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